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I
The corporation tax structure as most recently revised in 1942 is yielding an
unprecedented volume of revenue. Total tax liabilities of corporations in 1942 will be
ten times as large as they were in 1939 (Table I), the major part of the increase
coming from an excess profits tax which was not enacted until x94o. This tax alone
accounts for almost $8 billion, or two thirds of total corporate tax liabilities in 1942.
But in spite of the huge increase in corporate taxes, it is estimated that income
after taxes for all corporations will have increased from $4 billion in 1939 to over $7
billion in 1942. For profitable corporations, alone, income after taxes will have
increased from $6 billion to over $8 billion. These increases in income after taxes are
explained by the fact that corporate income before taxes rose from over $5 billion in
1939 to almost $i9 billion in 1942.
A comparison of income after taxes in 1942 with 1941 of corporations in general
shows an increase of 4l. However, Treasury estimates indicate that net income after
taxes for profitable corporations, alone, will be less in 1942 than in 1941. The esti-
mated increase of net income after taxes in 1942 over 1941 results from a decline in
the estimated deficits of unprofitable corporations. Therefore, many individual
corporations will have suffered diminutions in net income in 1942 as compared
with 194.1
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' An examination was made of the earnings records of 373 large industrial corporations taken from
the sample used by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in its series of quarterly
earnings and dividends. A considerable number of these corporations reported substantially less income
after taxes in the first three quarters of 1942 than the comparable period in 1941; income after taxes
in 1942 of two-fifths of the sample fell more than 25 percent below 1941. Care should be taken in
interpreting these data since they are based on book rather than tax data. Taxes were overaccrued to
the extent they were based on the House version of the Revenue Bill of 1942 rather than the final act,
passed in October. Furthermore, contingency reserves have been deducted. A sample of 40 large cor-
porations exhibited an increase of 6o percent in reserve deductions in 1942 as compared with 1941; this
increase represented 7 percent of 1941 net income.
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TABLE I
NET INCOME AND TAX LIABILITIES OF CORPORATIONS, 1939-1942
(In millions)
1939actual
I. Net income, profitable corporations ....... $7,232
2. Deficits, unprofitable corporations ......... 1,977
3. Net income, all corporations .............. 5,256'
4. Normal tax and surtax ................... 1,216
5. Excess profits tax ........................ -
6. Total taxes on income .................... 1,216
7. Net income after taxes, profitable
corporations ......................... 6,oi6
8. Net income after taxes, all corporations ..... 4,040
Z940
actual
$9,523
2,226
7,296b
2,144
375*
2,519
7,004
4,777
1941
estimated
$15,950
1,700
14,250
3,750
3,400
7,150
1942
estimated
$20,000
,000
19,000
3,900
7,700'
XI,6oo'
8,800 8,400
7,100 7,400
Sources: TrEAs. DEP'T, STATIsnCs op INcOME, 1939-40, Pt. 2. Treas. Dep't, Div. of Research and
Statistics, 1941-42.
'Excludes dividends received from domestic corporations, but includes tax-exempt interest.
' Due to rounding, individual items do not necessarily add to totals.
' Estimated.
' Net after postwar refund.
The impact of corporation taxes on particular corporations depends on the diverse
situations in which they find themselves as a result of the war, as well as the par-
ticular taxes bearing on them in these situations, and their ability to pass on the
burden of these taxes.
There are two general situations in which the impact of war taxation is especially
heavy. First, increased normal and surtaxes bear heavily on corporations with stable
or declining earnings before taxes during the war years. Corporations in this position,
especially if they have outstanding preference shares, e.g., public utilities, may find it
difficult or impossible to maintain common-stock dividends at the prewar level, or
even at reduced levels.
Secondly, the corporation with earnings greatly increased over their prewar level
as the result of greatly expanded war production is inevitably subject to very high
effective tax rates. These corporations often face cash shortages because of heavy
working-capital demands and maturing tax liabilities.
In contrast, the burden of wartime taxation is much less severe for two other
classes of corporations. First, corporations with high base-period earnings may earn a
high rate of return before being subject to excess profits taxation. Secondly, corpora-
tions which customarily earn very low rates on large amounts of invested capital may
substantially increase their earnings free of the excess profits tax. For example, with
their large invested-capital credits, railroads have not been subject to high effective tax
rates despite the tremendous increase in their earnings.
II
It is not only the impact in the first instance of wartime taxes on corporations
which determines the relative merits or defects of the wartime corporate tax structure,
but also their incidence and effects. Thus, it is necessary to consider how these taxes
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are affecting the behavior of individual firms. Are they weakening the resistance to
rising costs? Are they encouraging inefficiency, waste, and socially unnecessary
expenditures? Are they retarding production? Finally, are they discriminating
against stockholders by forcing upon them disproportionate reductions in current
consumption?
Definitive answers to these questions cannot be given. Our experience with war-
time taxation has been too brief to permit empirical tests of its effects on business
practices and policies. In any event, the tax program is but one of many abnormal
factors influencing the behavior of business firms in wartime.
The following is a preliminary appraisal of the burden of wartime taxes. In a
situation in which the choices of businessmen with respect to the products they will
produce and the prices they will charge are strictly limited by government controls,
economic analysis operating within a peacetime frame of reference may have little
relevance. Only within the framework of priorities, price and wage controls, and the
role of the Government as the principal buyer, can the burden of wartime taxes be
assessed.
i. Wartime taxes and costs
The excess profits tax may affect costs by affecting the efficiency with which labor
and other resources are used in production, and the prices which businessmen are
willing to pay for these resources. 2 It has been held that high excess profits taxes
operate on both of these determinants of cost so as to impede the war effort. High
marginal rates of taxation, it is argued, leave the businessman with little incentive to
resist demands for increased wages and materials prices, or to exercise rigid controls
over operations. Consequently, it is concluded, high tax rates lead inevitably to higher
factor prices and increasing inefficiency in the utilization of labor and materials.
These considerations have important implications. Increases in wage rates, if they
fail to increase the production of consumers' goods, tend to widen the inflationary gap
between disposable income and consumable goods and services. Inefficient utilization
of scarce resources either will have a similar effect, if the supply of consumers' goods
currently available is reduced, or will decrease the output of war material. Thus,
instead of being anti-inflationary, high excess profits taxes on corporations may con-
tribute to the upward movement of prices. Although they reduce the opportunities
for profit inflation, such taxes may well encourage cost inflation. Of these two forms
of inflation, the latter may indeed be the more serious; a profit inflation may be more
easily corrected in the postwar period than a cost inflation.
While high marginal rates of taxation may produce a situation favorable to rising
costs, it does not follow that the present excess profits tax will necessarily raise prices
by increasing costs. In the first place, the precise point at which taxes begin to
weaken the profit motive appreciably is not rigidly fixed in the determinations of
'The effect of the corporation income tax on costs is probably not very significant, except to the extent
that lower rates are anticipated after the war. This latter consideration may encourage expenditures which
would not ordinarily be made at the present time.
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businessmen. Secondly, the importance of the profit motive is reduced in time of
war. Certainly, the decisions of businessmen in wartime are affected not only by high
taxes but by other factors as well, some of which may offset or nullify the influence of
the tax factor.
Effects on productive efficiency
The proposition that an 8i% rate of taxation3 on excess profits will encourage
waste and inefficiency rests on two assumptions, neither of which can be accepted
without qualification. One of these, namely, that business decisions are motivated
primarily by short-run profit considerations, appears to be at variance with the
admitted concern of most businessmen over their postwar operations. To allow
inefficient and wasteful practices to spread throughout plants engaged in war produc-
tion would be to weaken the postwar competitive position of such plants. If the
short-run view is not the predominant one, a temporary tax, even if it were imposed
at a ioo% rate, would have less effect on business decisions than is commonly sup-
posed.
The other assumption underlying the proposition that high war taxes encourage
inefficient operations is that the performance of those persons who exercise direct
control over business operations is determined in part by the level of profits after
taxes. Especially in large enterprises, ownership and management are often not
identical; the responsibility for efficient operations lies on management rather than
on the owners. To the extent that the rewards to management are a function of the
level of profits, the best measure of managerial efficiency is provided by profits before,
rather than after, taxes. Moreover, management itself may be motivated by other
considerations than the maximization of profits either before or after taxes. It may,
for example, view efficient operation as an end in itself. Whether high taxes have an
appreciable effect upon the quality of management, especially in the case of large
enterprises is, therefore, open to question.
A stronger case can be iaade for the proposition that the excess profits tax may
encourage expenditures which would not be made in its absence, if such expenditures
are likely to yield benefits in the postwar period. The most obvious example of this
kind of expenditure is advertising. A dollar spent for advertising in 1939 represented
a net outlay of 81 cents. However, a dollar so spent in 1942 by a corporation subject
to the excess profits tax represented a net outlay of only 19 cents. 4 A businessman
who was in doubt whether an advertising dollar was worth 81 cents may be easily
convinced that it is worth 19 cents. In other words, high taxes enable corporations to
purchase valuable goodwill and prestige at little cost to themselves.5
'This assumes a nominal rate of go%, less a postwar credit equal to xo% of the tax which may be
used currently to the extent of certain reductions in debt.
'If the dollar had not been spent, the taxes on it would have been i9 cents in 1939 and 81 cents
(taking into account the postwar credit) in 1942.
The benefits from advertising must generally be yielded in a period in which lower tax rates arc
anticipated, otherwise the benefit would be taxable at the same rate as the cost is deducted. Even if rates
are expected to remain high, however, additional advertising outlays may be encouraged.
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Other examples of this kind of tax-stimulated spending can undoubtedly be found
in higher salaries paid to executives, in larger fees paid for the professional services
of lawyers, accountants, and tax consultants, more properly treated in the following
section, and in increased outlays for maintenance and repairs.' In view of an exist-
ing excess profits tax, these expenditures can be justified by the firm in terms of
probable future yields in excess of small current outlays.
These effects of excess profits taxes on efficiency and economy of production are
offset by a number of other factors operating in time of war.
First, the Government is now the principal buyer of the nation's output. Although
the Government's ability to maintain a careful check on the operation of those firms
from which it buys should not be exaggerated, it is none the less true that cost anal-
yses and controls are used by the Government in the placement of its contracts.
Secondly, the Government can allocate scarce manpower and materials to the most
efficient producers. Thirdly, salaries are subject to governmental control. Fourthly,
the allowability of such costs as professional fees, advertising, and the like, as deduc-
tions for tax purposes is dependent upon their reasonableness as determined by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the courts. Finally, in some future year or years the
firm's earnings may fall below its excess profits credit, or losses may be suffered. The
carry-back of losses and unused excess profits credits, authorized by the Revenue Act
of I942, may be sufficient to wipe out taxable excess profits completely. In this event
the net cost of expenditures would be increased more than threefold, that is, from 19
cents per dollar of expenditure to 6o cents per dollar of expenditure.
In combination, these factors cannot be counted on to offset fully the influence of
the tax factor on the efficiency of operations. However, they substantially limit its
scope.
Effects on prices of labor and materials
Excess profits taxes tend to weaken the resistance of employers to demands for
wage increases by reducing the net cost of these increases to the taxpayer. As in the
case of expenditures for advertising, the taxpayer may bear no more than i9%
of the wage increase. On the other hand, demands for wage increases would be
strengthened by the absence of high taxes on excess profits as much as, or more than,
resistance to these demands is weakened by the existence of such taxes. In any case,
the Presidential order designed to stabilize wages has undoubtedly limited, for the
present, unwarranted increases in wage rates.7
Another basis for the claim that the excess profits tax inflates costs has been found
in the nature of government contracts. It has been declared that the procedure of
renegotiating contract prices places all government contracts, whether fixed-price or
cost-plus-fixed-fee, on a cost-plus-percentage-fee basis. The experience of the last war
' Under-maintenance characterizes the operations of many firms at the present time.
'Furthermore, had the decree to stabilize wages been politically possible without a high excess profits
tax, wage costs, as distinct from wage rates, might have increased. Labor might not care to exert a
maximum effort if this merely increased corporate profits.
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demonstrated that cost-plus-percentage-fee contracts encourage inefficient production.
In the present war, it is claimed, the amount of profits on contracts, as allowed by
the various price adjustment boards, is determined as a certain percentage of total sales.
Total sales may be a function of costs. Thus, allowable profits become a function of
costs, encouraging cost increases. If a firm attempts to maintain profits after taxes
at a constant level, it will, in the face of increased war taxation, inflate its costs and
thus secure larger profits before taxes. So, it is concluded, a vicious spiral is initiated;
higher tax rates result in higher costs.
In view of the cost controls previously discussed, the danger of cost increases aris-
ing from the nature of government contracts appears to be limited. Furthermore, the
percentage of profit allowed by the price adjustment boards is not purely mechanical.
Recognition is given to the efficiency of the firm and the trend of its costs, the more
efficient firm being allowed wider profit margins.8
On balance, no conclusive statement can at present be made regarding the effect
of the excess profits tax upon costs. However, the increases in costs which might
ordinarily result from an excess profits tax must run the gauntlet of many wartime
controls, and are, thereby, undoubtedly minimized.
2. Wartime taxes and prices
In addition to the indirect effects which wartime corporate taxes may have upon
prices via costs, such taxes may enter directly into the determination of price policies.
In peacetime the framework within which the firm must formulate its price policy
is established by the competition both of other firms within the same industry and of
other industries. The price policy of a given firm is conditioned by the price policy
of its competitors, and intelligent decisions to alter prices must take into account
possible repercussions upon the decisions of competitors. Moreover, the sole aim of
the firm's price policy cannot be to maximize profits in the immediate future. Too
high a level of profits might invite governmental regulation or new competitors to
enter the industry, thus prejudicing long-run profits.
Businessmen usually insist that within this framework it is possible to shift higher
income taxes onto consumers, while, until recently, economists generally have held
this not to be the case.9 These issues cannot be resolved here. It may be useful, how-
ever, to point out some of the changes wrought by the war in the framework within
which price policies are formulated.
One important change is the new role of the Government as the ultimate
purchaser of over half of the current output of goods and services; its control over
8 Joint Statement by the War, Navy and Treasury Departments and the Maritime Commission, Pur-
poses, Principles, Policies and Interpretations under Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense
Appropriation Act, z942, as amended, March 31, 1943.
9 See E. R. A. Seligman, Income Taxes and the Price Level, in SrunlEs IN Ptuhm FINANCE (1925);
and W. H. Coates, Memorandum on the Incidence of the Income Tax, APPENDICES TO THE REPORT OF nrm
[CoLwYN] COMMrI-E ON NATIONAL DEBT AND TAXATION (1927) App. X. However, for a different
viewpoint, see D. H. Robertson, The Colyn Committee, the Income Tax and the Price Level (Dec. 1927)
Vol. 37, No. 148, ECON. J., P. 566 (reprinted in ECONOMIC FAOMENTS); DUNCAN BLACK, THE INCI-
DENCE OF THE INCOME TAX (1939).
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the price policies of firms is increased. There is, nevertheless, a wide range of inde-
terminancy in the formulation of reasonable prices, within which contracting officers
and price adjustment boards might allow for wartime taxes through higher contract
prices.
Although contracting officers, knowing that most excessive profits will be recap-
tured by wartime taxes, may not haggle as long over prices as they otherwise would,
the placement of orders on an individual-contract basis makes it unlikely that contract-
ing officers could, or would, make direct allowance for wartime taxes. Furthermore,
the process of renegotiation by the price adjustment boards makes available to the
military establishment a further check on contract prices. The general position of
these boards is reflected in the statement "that the reasonableness of profits should be
determined before provision for Federal income and excess profits taxes."10
Aside from its regulation of war material prices, the Government, in wartime,
controls the prices of consumers' goods and services. With purchasing power greatly
exceeding the flow of goods available for purchase, the possibility of a price policy
which transfers the burden of wartime corporate taxes to the consumer would seem
greatly enhanced. However, the Office of Price Administration, the agency under
whose jurisdiction has been placed the pricing of most consumers' goods and services,
holds :11
For price control purposes it is profits before taxes that are significant. The Congress de-
termines, in its tax legislation, what shall be the distribution of the financial burdens of war
-who shall pay the taxes and how much they shall pay. To permit prices to increase so as
to cover income and excess profits taxes levied upon corporations, and thus to permit such
taxes to be passed on by the corporation to the consumer, would defeat the intention of
Congress.
A similar policy has been followed in the regulation of transportation and public
utilities.' 2
This does not mean that wartime taxes may not indirectly affect prices. Because
of the reduction in corporate income after taxes resulting from wartime taxation, the
amount of reasonable profits before taxes allowed by public agencies may be more
generous than would otherwise be the case. Indeed, the Office of Price Administra-
tion has stated: "So necessary was the expansion of output to our defense in the
period prior to December 7, 1941, and to the successful prosecution of the war since
that date, that the Office felt impelled to err in the direction of laxity rather than in
1oJoint Statement, op. cit., supra note 8, at 7.
'XOPA, TimwQuQaRTELm REPORT (for the period ended Oct. 31, 1942) 23.WIn the determination of public-utility rates, only peacetime taxes have been allowed as a cost. The
Federal Power Commission has stated: "Increased tax burdens must be borne by the utility which enjoys
a monopolistic position in the economic field, as well as by others who have no such advantage." Fed.
Power Comm'n, Op. No. 8o, In the Matter of Pan Handle Eastern Pipe Line Co. and others, Sept. 22,
1942, p. 31.
Transportation-rate determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission has generally not taken
income taxes into account. Reduced Rates, 68 I.C.C. 767, 683 (1922) cited in Increased Railway Rates,
Fares, and Charges, 248 I.C.C. 556 (1942).
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the direction of rigor."'3 In the absence of wartime taxation, such laxity would
probably not have been permitted.
This examination suggests that the price level is somewhat higher than it would
have been in the absence of wartime corporation taxes. However, to the extent that
the Government is itself the purchaser of goods and services, the net price paid
(actual expenditures less tax receipts resulting therefrom) is the price which must be
taken into account. As substantially less than iooo of wartime taxes are included in
the prices actually paid, it follows that this net price must be less than it would have
been in the absence of such taxes.
The same conclusion, however, cannot be extended to the prices of goods and
services purchased by individual consumers. Increases in prices of consumers' goods
will impose varying burdens on different income groups.
3. Wartime taxes and dividends
An appraisal of wartime taxation must also consider the effect of such taxation
on the payment of dividends by corporations. This effect is of particular importance
in assessing the burden of wartime corporation taxes on the individual owners of
corporate enterprise, since, in some cases, dividend income represents their only
current claim on the national product.
Furthermore, as consumable commodities become increasingly scarce and as prices
rise, firms may strip themselves of working capital in order to meet increased de-
mands for dividends by stockholders. Such a reduction of working capital would
have serious postwar implications by increasing the difficulty of the postwar readjust-
ment. On the other hand, failure of wartime taxation to siphon off possible increases
in dividends as a result of increased profits would only increase the present gap
between commodities and services available for consumption and disposable income.
The relationship between dividends paid'4 and corporate net income after taxes"
for the period 1933 through 1942 as shown in Chart I below, does not include the
years 1936-37 and 1942. The undistributed profits tax was in effect in the first two of
these years, resulting in larger dividend payments than would otherwise have been
the case. The line of regression (Chart I) indicates that for the period from X933
through 1941, a change of 27 cents in dividend payments was associated with a
change of one dollar in net income.' 6 In the year 1942, however, although net income
after taxes increased, dividend payments decreased. If the same relationship between
net income and dividends in the period 1933 through 1941 had been maintained in
1942, dividends would have been $4,650 million, rather than $4,200 million1 To
what can this seeming change in behavior be attributed?
23 OpA, op. cit., supra note ix, at 26.
14 Gross dividends paid, less dividends received from domestic corporations.
' Compiled net profit or net loss, less all taxes and dividends received from domestic corporations.
21 Ile line of regression was Y --. 27X + 2679 million; the coefficient of correlation was .99, and the
standard error of estimate, $S17 million.
"A recent estimate by the Department of Commerce is even lower-$3,983 million. See Tynan
Smith and Robert Sherman, Recent Trends in Corporate Profits, Ssmvay or CURRENT BUSINESS, June, Z943.
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NET INCOME AFTER TAXES AND DIVIDENDS PAID,
OF ALL CORPORATIONS, 1933-1942
Excluding Dividends Received from Domestic Corporations
-3 -2 -I 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NET INCOME AFTER TAXES, BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Source: For 1933-410, U.S. Treasury Departmenf, Statistics of Income, Part 2.
For 1941-42, U.S. Treasury Deportment, Division of Research and Stahst/c.
In the first place, the proportion of the 1942 excess profits tax liabilities represented
by the postwar credit (io%) has not been deducted from net income after taxes. For
current dividend purposes, however, the postwar credit represents a commitment of
funds in the same sense as taxes,18 unless used for debt repayment. It may be as
large as $50o million. If 1942 income were reduced by this amount, the relationship
between income and dividends in that year would diverge less from the 1933-41
relationship.
Furthermore, it must be recalled that the increase in corporate net income after
taxes in 1942 over 1941 is not attributed to an anticipated increase in aggregate net
income of income corporations, but to a decrease in aggregate deficits of deficit cor-
porations.19 This factor alone would have reduced aggregate dividends as compared
with aggregate income. That dividends were not more greatly reduced may imply
a weakening in the working capital position of some net income corporations, par-
ticularly when the postwar credit discussed above is taken into account.
This latter point may take on further significance when the inadequacy of an
annual determination of income is considered. Income may be overstated because
" Strictly speaking, this may not be true. Increases in the postwar credit may result in reductions in
the amount of government bonds or similar securities which would otherwise be held by the corporation.
"o See Table I, supra, p. X22.
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of inventory profits, undermaintenance of assets, inadequate provision for deprecia-
tion, or failure to reflect currently a reduction in income owing to possible future
losses. On the other hand, amortization of emergency facilities understates profits.
On balance, taxable income may be overstated. If corporation management bases its
dividend policy on such overstated income, the corporation may find itself with
inadequate postwar reserves.
Finally, in a period of rapid expansion of output, as in x942, cash demands for
new facilities, additional inventories, and working capital, may require extensive
plowing-in of profits. As long as taxes take a relatively small percentage of net
income before taxes, dividends may be maintained in spite of this expansion. How-
ever, if taxes take a substantial portion of net income, expansion may be possible
only at the expense of current dividends.
All of these considerations must be weighed in assessing the presence or absence
of conservatism in corporate dividend policies in I942. As yet, it would appear that
corporate dividend policies, taken as a whole, have fully taken into account the
wartime corporate tax program, and have reduced dividends concomitantly. 0
4. Wartime taxes and production
The general relationship between war taxes and the level of production has been
discussed above,21 where particular attention was given to the effects of high marginal
rates of taxation on productive efficiency. The excess profits tax may also affect the
level of war output in a number of special situations.
The excess profits tax affects the availability of investment funds needed to finance
increased production. This tax, generally speaking, makes no allowance for risks
assumed in expanding war production. The firm which, at the behest of the Gov-
ernment, undertakes to double, triple, or quadruple, its normal output is allowed, in
addition to its average-earnings base, only 8% of its net equity capital additions
through sale of stock. This in effect usually means that the more war production is
expanded, the more closely the excess profits credit approaches the 8/ return allowed
on additional capital.2 2 Although an assured return of 8% for the postwar as well
as the war years might be sufficient to attract new equity capital into these expanding
enterprises, the high degree of uncertainty with respect to the postwar position of
these firms makes them relatively unattractive outlets for investment funds. Con-
sequently, the high effective rates of taxation to which many such firms are subjected
not only prevent them from financing their working capital needs out of profits, but
also serve to deprive them of new working capital from private sources.28 This
"°Many corporations, as evidenced by their 1942 financial statements, arc substantially discounting
current earnings by setting up contingency reserves. These reserves are not deductible from taxable income.
21 See p. 124, supra.
"Corporations with invested capital of less than $5 million may find it to their advantage to use the
invested-capital method of computing the excess profits credit which allows such corporations a credit of
8% on old and io% on new equity capital.
" To the extent that the requirements for increased production take the form of new plants and
equipment, recovery of the investment in such plant is facilitated by the five-year amortization provisions
enacted in the Second Revenue Act of 1940. These provisions, however, do not extend to working capital,
and it is largely with respect to this type of capital that the small firms face particular embarrassment.
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financial problem is especially critical in the case of small firms with low excess profits
credits.
Thus, growing firms are confronted with the alternative of expanding operations
less rapidly than is desired by the Government, or of obtaining funds from Govern-
ment sources. Through its various agencies, the Government does stand ready to
finance both the fixed-capital and working-capital requirements of firms engaged in
filling war contracts. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation makes direct loans
to such firms on the security of the contracts. In addition, the military establishment
makes advances on war contracts, and subcontracts. The military establishment may
also guarantee loans made by banks and other lending institutions to war contractors
-the so-called "V-Loan."
It appears, however, that government assistance in financing working-capital
requirements has not altogether overcome the financial difficulties of small expanding
corporations. Complaints are still made that the high effective rates of taxation to
which these firms are subject are interfering with the potential expansion of the
war-production program. Consequently, it can be said that the financial difficulties
attributable in part to high war taxes threaten at some points to prevent the attain-
ment of maximum output.2 4
The tax law does make allowances for unusual risks associated with attempts to
increase the production of much-needed war materials under certain special circum-
stances. In order to encourage the production of the so-called "strategic minerals,"
complete exemption from excess profits taxes has been given to profits from the
production of twelve minerals, most of them not ordinarily produced in the United
States."
Another special case in which excess profits taxes may inhibit production if excess
profits are inaccurately defined is to be found in the case of certain mining proper-
ties.&2 The amount of income which most operators can ultimately derive from such
properties is limited by the extent of ore reserves. Whereas the acceleration of pro-
duction during the war years need have no. effect upon postwar operations of non-
mining enterprises, the greater the increase in mine output during the war, the
smaller will be the potential output in postwar years. Therefore, if the acceleration
of output subjects mining operators to excess profits taxation, they may have an
inducement to limit output during the war.
However, the acceleration of output need not always mean that the owners of
mineral resources will be unreasonably burdened by heavy taxes on income bunched
in the war years. The severity of the hardships imposed will, in general, depend upon
the extent to which accelerated output during the war will actually reduce postwar
profits. If the additional output is small relative to the total reserves in the property,
"This conclusion is based on views expressed by small businessmen engaged in production under war
contracts.
' Revenue Act of 1942, §226.
A similar situation is found in the case of timber properties, although for certain types of timber
stands more or less continuous operations are possible.
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no great sacrifice is imposed on the operator who is forced to accept a low profit
margin on ore which would not have been mined for at least 2o or 30 years. Even if
a profit at the end of that time was assured, its present value would be small. More-
over, the extraordinary demand for certain minerals during the war may afford some
owners of mineral resources an opportunity to recover assets which they would have
little or no chance to recover under normal circumstances. Many marginal ore
deposits are now being worked which will have little value to their owners once
foreign sources of supply are again opened up.
This special situation of the operators of certain mining and timber properties was
recognized in the Revenue Act of 1942,27 and relief from excess profits taxes was
afforded to such operators with respect to income attributable to accelerated output.
Operators are, however, given full relief from excess profits taxes on income
attributable to their increased output only in those cases where such output represents
a high percentage of remaining reserves.
III
The conclusions of this analysis can be summarized briefly. In the first place, the
excess profits tax in wartime has certain limited effects on the cost of production.
Similar effects do not result from the corporation income tax. In the second place,
wartime corporation taxes exercise some direct influence on the price level; they
tend to relax, somewhat, the severity with which prices are regulated. This price
effect is in addition to that resulting from increased costs. In the third place, wartime
corporation taxes have held 1942 dividends as compared with net income after taxes
at least to the average relationship between income and dividends from the years
1933 through 1941. In general, the financial strength of corporations does not appear
to have been impaired. And finally, excess profits taxes, in some cases, have increased
the financial problems of some firms and thus prevented the full attainment of
potential output.
2T §209.
